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The Facts of Stigma: What’s Missing from the Procedural 
Due Process of Mental Health Commitment 
Alexandra S. Bornstein* 
Abstract: 
This is the first systematic review of federal, judicial opinions that engage 
the stigma of mental health commitment in the context of procedural due process. 
In 1979, in Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that the stigma, or 
adverse social consequences, of civil commitment is relevant to the procedural 
due process analysis. The following year, in Vitek v. Jones, the Court held that 
the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer from a prison to a mental health 
facility, coupled with mandatory treatment, triggered procedural protections. 
While these cases importantly suggested a role for stigma in procedural due 
process, they left many questions related to the implementation of these standards 
unanswered. As a result, across the cases analyzed in this review, judges 
expressed different views of this stigma and consistently underestimated the real 
impact of this stigma. This in turn resulted in judges consistently underestimating 
the liberty interest created by commitment and the need for procedural due 
process. In order to properly protect individuals against the risk of erroneous 
commitment, judges must engage in further fact finding to determine the real 
harm that results from the stigma of mental health commitment. 
  
                                                 
 * Columbia Law School, J.D. 2018; Middlebury College, B.A. 2011. Many thanks to 
Professor Kristen Underhill, for her guidance through every stage of this process; to the editors of 
the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, & Ethics, for their excellent feedback and editorial 
assistance; and to my family, Susan, Mitch, Matt, and Tim, for their constant support. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A study published in 2000 found that 54 percent of respondents believed an 
individual with any mental illness was a danger to others. That same study found 
that 58 percent of respondents would not want an individual with any mental 
illness as a coworker and that 68 percent would not want that same individual 
marrying into their family.1 Research suggests that the stigma associated with 
serious mental illness, mental illness that might require either voluntary or 
involuntary inpatient hospitalization, is even more profound. A 2008 survey on 
the public perception of one serious mental illness, schizophrenia, found that 77 
percent of people would feel uncomfortable and 80 percent would fear for their 
safety around a person with untreated schizophrenia; 77 percent would feel 
uncomfortable working with that person; and 80 percent expressed discomfort 
related to dating that person.2 Such stigma is unsurprising when viewed in light 
of how serious mental illness and mental hospitals are portrayed in popular 
culture—think One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, the more recent American 
Horror Story: Asylum (a hospital physician experiments on patients and then 
leaves them to feed on other patients), or the mental-hospital-themed haunted 
houses that pop up all over the country for Halloween.3 
This Note examines how that stigma affects the procedural due process 
afforded to individuals subject to involuntary hospitalization for mental illness. 
Nearly forty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized the severity of the stigma 
associated with involuntary commitment to a mental health hospital in a pair of 
cases related to civil and criminal mental health commitment, respectively. In 
Addington v. Texas, the Court considered the appropriate standard of proof to be 
applied in civil commitment hearings. Justice Burger, writing for the Court, 
stated that civil commitment constitutes a deprivation of liberty in part because 
                                                 
 1 Jack K. Martin et al., Of Fear and Loathing: The Role of ‘Disturbing Behavior,’ Labels, and 
Causal Attributions in Shaping Public Attitudes toward People with Mental Illness, 41 J. HEALTH & 
SOC. BEHAV. 208, 216 (2000). 
 2 Schizophrenia: Public Attitudes, Personal Needs, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS 8 (May 
13, 2008), https://www.nami.org/schizophreniasurvey. 
 3 Colby Itkowitz, Halloween Attractions Use Mental Illness to Scare Us. Here’s Why 
Advocates Say It Must Stop, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/inspired-life/wp/2016/10/25/this-halloween-mental-health-
advocates-are-taking-a-powerful-stand-against-attractions-depicting-
asylums/?utm_term=.80e98b67420a. An amusement park on the border of North and South 
Carolina includes this description for its “7th Ward Asylum”: “You would be crazy to tour this 
twisted asylum. Lost and tortured souls are all that remain, but you’ll see plenty that will make you 
question your sanity . . . . The 7th Ward was home to the Carolina’s most chronically insane. From 
murderers to crazed psychopaths, many of the poor souls trapped behind the Gothic walls would 
spend their entire lives there. As you walk these halls today, be sure to stay with your group. This is 
one place you don’t want to be committed.” Id. 
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commitment creates “adverse social consequences . . . whether we label this 
phenomena ‘stigma’ or choose to call it something else is less important than that 
we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on 
the individual.”4 In the following year, in Vitek v. Jones, the Court considered a 
procedural due process challenge to a Nebraska statute that gave the Director of 
Correctional Services the authority to transfer an incarcerated individual to a 
mental health facility without notice or hearing. The plaintiff argued that the Due 
Process clause entitled him to procedural protections before commitment because 
he had a liberty interest in not being stigmatized by commitment to a mental 
health facility. The Court agreed, to the extent that this stigma existed and was 
relevant to the procedural due process analysis. Justice Burger wrote “the 
stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary 
psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory 
behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of 
deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections.”5 
These two cases suggested, for the first time, a role for stigma in procedural 
due process analysis with respect to mental health commitment. Yet in so doing, 
the Supreme Court provided only minimal explanation for how it arrived at the 
underlying conclusion that stigma results from commitment or how this 
conclusion fits into the broader procedural due process analysis. In the nearly 
forty years since these holdings, the Supreme Court has offered little 
clarification. Instead, it has left it to lower court judges to determine how to 
engage with the stigma of mental health commitment in the context of procedural 
due process. 
This study seeks to determine how judges have applied the holdings in 
Addington and Vitek to measure their real impact on the procedural due process 
protections afforded to individuals facing mental health commitment 
proceedings. A systematic review was conducted of all federal, judicial opinions 
that discussed the stigma of mental health commitment in the context of 
procedural due process analysis since the Supreme Court decided these two 
cases. This methodology was utilized for its application in analyzing the 
variability in how judges have interpreted these standards across all opinions that 
have engaged with them.6 
                                                 
 4 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1979). 
 5 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980). 
 6 For further discussion of the advantages of systematic review in the context of legal 
doctrinal analysis, see William Baude et al., Making Doctrinal Work More Rigorous: Lessons from 
Systematic Reviews, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 42 (2017) (arguing that systematic review reduces the 
need for the reader to rely on the author’s credibility to believe her claims, makes it easier for the 
reader to access the uncertainty associated with a claim, creates more complete documentation 
which can support progress in the field, decreases real or perceived bias, and can reduce error); 
Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CAL. L. 
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The results of the following analysis suggest that there is immense variation 
in how judges have engaged with the stigma of mental health commitment in the 
context of procedural due process, since Addington and Vitek. Among some 
opinions, judges determined that the presence of this stigma clearly required 
procedural protection. Among others, it was much more difficult to ascertain 
what role this stigma played in the procedural due process analysis. In general, 
across all opinions, judges spent very little time discussing the stigma of mental 
health commitment. The result is that judges seem to have profoundly different 
understandings of stigma in this context and its role in the procedural due process 
analysis. Additionally, judges consistently fail to engage with current empirical 
evidence related to the real consequences of this stigma. The variability in 
judges’ treatment of stigma, as well as their anemic understanding of the many 
psychological, social, and economic consequences of stigma, has amounted to a 
systematic bias against plaintiffs seeking due process protection in commitment 
proceedings. While Addington and Vitek importantly included stigma in the 
procedural due process analysis in the context of mental health commitment, in 
many cases, judges have not implemented these standards properly. In these 
cases, judges must engage in their own fact finding to address those questions left 
unanswered by the Supreme Court. Given the limited fact-finding resources 
available to lower courts, this Note argues that a resource that aggregates relevant 
information on this subject, almost like a publicly available amicus brief, could 
assist judges in appropriately considering this issue while ensuring that judges 
engage with current research on the subject. 
The following section will provide a brief overview of mental health 
commitment laws in the United States, research related to the stigma associated 
with mental illness and mental health commitment, and a discussion of cases that 
have established stigma as relevant to the procedural due process analysis, 
including Addington and Vitek. 
II. BACKGROUND ON MENTAL HEALTH COMMITMENT AND THE ROLE OF 
STIGMA IN PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS 
a. Mental health commitment laws 
Involuntary, mental health commitment is the process by which the 
government compels an individual to receive mental health treatment in an 
inpatient, mental health facility.7 There are different mechanisms and standards 
                                                                                                                         
REV. 63 (2008) (discussing other advantages of systematic review of judicial opinions). 
 7 Most states also have outpatient commitment or assisted outpatient treatment laws, which 
give judges the authority to compel individuals to receive outpatient, community-based, mental 
health treatment. See What is AOT?, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. (Apr. 12, 2017), 
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/aot-one-pager.pdf. Outpatient 
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by which a person may be involuntarily committed. Although largely the 
province of state governments, there are also federal laws that dictate mental 
health commitment for certain populations. 
i. Civil commitment laws 
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have civil commitment laws. 
States have grounded their authority to enact such laws in two powers: the police 
power, to protect the state’s citizens from potentially dangerous people, and the 
patriae parens power, to protect potentially dangerous people from themselves. 
Although the specifics of these laws vary across states, most reflect these dual 
purposes. These laws generally require some showing that the individual is in 
fact mentally ill and that the individual is either a danger to themselves or to 
others.8 While the standards for dangerousness to others is and has been 
relatively consistent across states, the standard for dangerousness to one’s self 
varies across states and has varied over time. Previous standards limited the 
consideration to whether an individual presented an immediate, intentional, 
violent threat to themselves, specifically whether an individual had attempted 
suicide or engaged in self-mutilation, and whether such behavior would likely 
result in serious harm or death.9 Current standards still consider these factors but 
vary in what else they consider. For example, the Treatment Advocacy Center, a 
group that advocates for comprehensive mental health treatment including, when 
appropriate, mental health commitment, gives Pennsylvania’s commitment law a 
failing grade for its limited definition of dangerousness to one’s self.10 In addition 
to considering the likelihood of intentional, violent self-harm, judges also 
consider whether there is evidence that an individual is unable to “to satisfy . . . 
[their] need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection 
and safety” and that their inability to do so creates a “reasonable probability that 
death, serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 
30 days unless adequate treatment were afforded” through commitment.11. This 
standard is known as “grave disability.” 
By contrast, the Treatment Advocacy Center gives Illinois’s civil 
commitment law its highest possible grade due to its expansive definition of 
                                                                                                                         
commitment laws are not discussed in this Note and, to simplify, inpatient commitment is referred 
to as simply “mental health commitment.” 
 8 See Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 10 PSYCHIATRY 
30, 33 (2010). 
 9 Mental Health Commitment Laws A Survey of the States, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. (Feb. 
2014), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/2014-state-survey-
abridged.pdf. 
 10 Id. 
 11 50 PA CONS. STAT. § 7301(b)(2)(i). 
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danger to one’s self.12 Illinois’ law applies a “need-for-treatment” standard such 
that judges also consider whether an individual refuses to comply with treatment 
or cannot understand the need for treatment and as a result will likely suffer 
“mental and emotional deterioration.”13 As such, an individual may be committed 
under Illinois’ law before they become gravely disabled. Laws also vary across 
states with respect to who may commence proceedings; in some states, any party 
may commence proceedings, such as an individual’s family member,14 while in 
other states proceedings may only be commenced by mental health 
professionals.15 The federal government does not have a civil commitment law, 
but federal courts may of course consider procedural due process challenges to 
state civil commitment laws. 
ii. Criminal commitment 
Mental health commitment can also occur within state and federal prison 
systems. Prior to 1820, most people deemed mentally ill were imprisoned, not as 
a means of punishment but to remove them from the larger population.16 In the 
1820s, activists began protesting conditions and the lack of adequate mental 
health treatment in prisons. These activists advocated for the building of hospitals 
dedicated to the proper treatment of individuals with mental health conditions. 
By 1880, there were seventy-five public mental health hospitals and the majority 
of people diagnosed with mental health conditions had been transferred from 
prisons to these hospitals. The census in that year reported that, of all “insane 
people,” less than one percent were still residing in prisons or jails, while the 
remaining ninety-nine percent (nearly 59,000 people) were in public mental 
health facilities.17 
Eventually, this system broke down as well. By the 1960s, the poor 
conditions of these facilities created a backlash known as the 
“deinstitutionalization” movement.18 The deinstitutionalization movement called 
for and eventually succeeded in reducing the number of people confined to 
residential, mental health facilities. While seemingly well intentioned, this 
movement removed people from their residential treatment without providing 
                                                 
 12 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-119. 
 13 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-119. 
 14 For example, any “responsible party” may commence the process of involuntary 
commitment in a Pennsylvania trial court. 50 PA CONS. STAT. § 7304(c)(1). 
 15 See, e.g., New York’s inpatient commitment law. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(a). 
 16 The Treatment of Persons with Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails: A State Survey, 
TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. 9–11 (Apr. 8, 2014), 
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/treatment-behind-bars/treatment-
behind-bars.pdf. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 11. 
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adequate alternative treatment. Without treatment, people were unable to 
successfully reincorporate into society and many committed crimes for which 
they were arrested and imprisoned. A prison psychologist was quoted in a 
seminal 1972 article saying, “[w]e are literally drowning in patients.”19 This trend 
has continued. 20 According to surveys done by the Department of Justice in 2002 
and 2004, forty-four percent of all federal prisoners, fifty-six percent of all state 
prisoners, and sixty-four percent of all individuals in local jails reported 
experiencing mental health symptoms or receiving treatment from a mental 
health professional in the previous twelve months.21 These estimates compare to 
roughly eighteen percent of the general population, according to a 2014 study 
done by the National Institute of Mental Health.22 
Although many people with mental health conditions that are convicted of 
crimes are incarcerated and remain incarcerated, there are both state and federal 
laws that allow for commitment to mental health facilities within the criminal 
justice system. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4243–4246 provide procedure by which a federal 
criminal offender may be either initially placed in or transferred into a mental 
health facility.23 
If an individual is found not guilty of an offense for reason of insanity, 18 
U.S.C. § 4243 provides that that individual will be committed to a mental health 
facility unless it can be shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that their 
“release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or 
serious damage of property of another.”24 If an individual is convicted of an 
offense and suffers from a mental health condition, but does not bring an insanity 
defense, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 provides that they may still be committed to a mental 
health facility rather than being incarcerated.25 In this case, the Attorney General 
may request a hearing to demonstrate that that individual should still be 
committed to a mental health facility prior to sentencing.26 Per 18 U.S.C. § 4245, 
if an individual was convicted of a crime, incarcerated, and then later determined 
                                                 
 19 Id. 
 20 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: US PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS 24 (2001), www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003 (“Thousands of mentally ill are left 
untreated and unhelped until they have deteriorated so greatly that they wind up arrested and 
prosecuted for crimes they might never have committed had they been able to access therapy, 
medication, and assisted living facilities in the community.”). 
 21 DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 213600, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 
(2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. 
 22 Any Mental Illness (AMI) Among U.S. Adults, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
(2014), https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/any-mental-illness-ami-among-us-
adults.shtml. 
 23 18 U.S.C. § 4243–4246 (2012). 
 24 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (2012). 
 25 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (2012). 
 26 Id. 
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to require inpatient treatment, they may be transferred to a mental health facility 
after a hearing is held.27 The Nebraska analogue to this federal law, which was at 
issue in Vitek v. Jones, did not require a hearing prior to transfer. This law will be 
discussed further in Part II.c, infra. Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 4246 provides the 
procedure by which an individual may continue to be committed even after his 
initial sentence has elapsed.28 All fifty states and the District of Columbia have 
similar laws allowing for commitment within the prison system. 
b. Stigma associated with mental illness and mental health commitment 
The classical sociological literature defines stigma as an “‘attribute that is 
deeply discrediting’ that reduces the bearer ‘from a whole and usual person to a 
tainted, discounted one.’”29A more recent review of the literature provides 
several definitions of the term: “[a] deeply discrediting attribute; ‘mark of 
shame’; ‘mark of oppression’; devalued social identity.”30 The authors go on to 
describe four essential components of stigma. These elements include: “(a) 
distinguishing and labeling differences, (b) associating human differences with 
negative attributions or stereotypes, (c) separating ‘us’ from ‘them,’ and (d) 
experiencing status loss and discrimination.”31 
Both Justice Burger in Addington and Justice White in Vitek focused on the 
consequences of the stigma associated with mental health commitment. Much 
research has been done on this topic. The relevant literature in fact identifies two 
related though distinct types of stigma that can have different consequences for 
individuals: public stigma and internalized stigma.32 Public stigma is “the 
phenomenon of large social groups endorsing stereotypes about and acting 
against a stigmatized group.”33 Studies have identified numerous consequences 
correlated with the public stigma associated with mental illness. These 
consequences include, for example, underemployment, joblessness, and the 
inability to live independently.34 While mental illness itself can affect these 
                                                 
 27 18 U.S.C. § 4245 (2012). 
 28 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2012). 
 29 Paula Abrams, The Scarlet Letter: The Supreme Court and the Language of Abortion 
Stigma, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 293, 299 (2013) (quoting ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON 
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3 (1963)). 
 30 Bernice A. Pescosolido & Jack K. Martin, The Stigma Complex, 41 ANN. REV. SOC. 87, 92 
(2015). 
 31 Id. at 91. 
 32 J.D. Livingston & J.E. Boyd, Correlates and Consequences of Internalized Stigma for 
People Living with Mental Illness: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 71 SOC. SCI. & MED. 
2150, 2151 (2010). 
 33 See, e.g., Patrick W. Corrigan et al., The Stigma of Mental Illness: Explanatory Models and 
Methods for Change, 11 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179 (2005). 
 34 Id. 
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outcomes directly, these studies demonstrate that stigma has an independent, 
additional effect. Other studies have also found public stigma to be associated 
with social isolation and a lower likelihood of seeking treatment.35 
Internalized stigma can affect how individuals view themselves. Individuals 
may come to believe that they do in fact possess the negative attributes that are 
ascribed to their broader stigmatized group. Individuals with mental illness may 
come to believe, for example, that they are dangerous or incompetent.36 Studies 
have shown internalized stigma to be associated with negative consequences, 
including increased symptom severity and poorer treatment adherence.37 
Although less frequently studied, involuntary commitment and 
hospitalization generally have been found to have an even greater stigmatizing 
effect than being perceived as mentally ill or receiving outpatient treatment.38 A 
recent study of several hundred individuals with serious mental illness who had 
been involuntarily hospitalized found that hospitalization created additional 
internalized stigma. Specifically, the study found greater incidence of feelings of 
shame and self-contempt, which in turn was found to lead to lower self-esteem 
and lower quality of life.39 Another qualitative study found that individuals 
reported higher levels of discrimination following hospitalization.40 A Brazilian 
study conducted among a hundred and sixty individuals with a history of 
involuntary commitment found that individuals with families with more biased 
views towards mental illness were more likely to be re-committed.41 
In the prison context, there are a number of negative consequences 
associated with being committed and being perceived as mentally ill. Prisoners, 
unsurprisingly, often possess the same biases against people with mental illness 
as do the general population. Prisoners labeled as mentally ill, experience social 
                                                 
 35 Deborah A. Perlick et al., Stigma as a Barrier to Recovery: Adverse Effects of Perceived 
Stigma on Social Adaptation of Persons Diagnosed with Bipolar Affective Disorder, 52 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1627 (2001); 2003 National Survey on Drug Use & Health: Results, Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., & Office of Applied 
Studies, (June 3, 2008), http:// www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k3nsduh/2k3Results.htm. 
 36 See, e.g., Corrigan, P.W. et al., The Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness: Implications for 
Self-Esteem and Self-Efficacy, 25 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 875 (2006); Jennifer Boyd Ritsher 
& Jo C. Phelan, Internalized Stigma Predicts Erosion of Morale Among Psychiatric Outpatients, 
129 PSYCHIATRY RES. 257 (2004); Philip T. Yanos et al., The Impact of Illness Identity on Recovery 
from Severe Mental Illness, 13 AMER. J. PSYCHOL. REHABILITATION 73 (2010). 
 37 See Livingston & Boyd, supra note 32. 
 38 Nicolas Rüsch et al., Emotional Reactions to Involuntary Psychiatric Hospitalization and 
Stigma-Related Stress Among People with Mental Illness, 264 EUR. ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY 
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 35 (2014). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Ingrid Sibitz et al., Impact of Coercive Measures on Life Stories: Qualitative Study, 199 
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 239 (2011). 
 41 Alexandre Andrade Loch, Stigma and Higher Rates of Psychiatric Re-hospitalization: São 
Paulo Public Mental Health System, 34 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE PSIQUIATRIA 185 (2012). 
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isolation and additional stigmatization.42 One account of prison life by Victor 
Hassine, a formerly incarcerated person, described individuals perceived as 
mentally ill as fundamentally disruptive to prison life. He wrote, “Their 
helplessness often made them the favorite victims of predatory inmates. Worst of 
all, their special needs and peculiar behavior destroyed the stability of the prison 
system.”43 It has been found that mentally ill prisoners are disproportionately 
victims of physical and sexual violence while in prison. A 2007 study of over 
7,500 prisoners (randomly sampled from a population of roughly 20,000 
prisoners) found that the number of incarcerated men that reported being victims 
of sexual violence was three times higher among men with mental health 
conditions than among men without diagnosed mental health conditions (one in 
twelve compared to one in thirty-three).44 The study also found a higher 
likelihood of reported sexual victimization among women with mental health 
conditions than among women without mental health conditions.45 It has also 
been found that women diagnosed with mental illness are less likely to receive 
parole.46 
c. Supreme Court jurisprudence on stigma in the procedural due process 
analysis 
Procedural due process guarantees that no state nor the federal government 
“shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”47 State-imposed stigma has for a long time been considered relevant to the 
existence of a liberty interest. Prior to 1976, several cases decided by the 
Supreme Court suggested that stigma, or reputational harm, created by the state 
was enough to implicate a liberty interest, thereby triggering due process 
protection.48 Yet in 1976, in Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court reversed course, 
holding that reputational harm created by a state-imposed label was relevant but 
not sufficient to trigger procedural protection under the Due Process clause of the 
                                                 
 42 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: US PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS 24 (2001) (citing TERRY KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND 
BARS AND WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT 20 (1999)). 
 43 VICTOR HASSINE, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: LIVING IN PRISON TODAY 29 (1996). 
 44 Nancy Wolff et al., Rates of Sexual Victimization in Prison for Inmates With and Without 
Mental Disorders, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1087, 1090 (2007). 
 45 Id. at 1091. 
 46 Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Losing Ground: Gendered Knowledges, Parole Risk, and 
Responsibility, 11 SOC. POL. 363 (2004). 
 47 U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. 
 48 Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-
Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 83–86 (2009) (citing Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 
429 (1969); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 573–74 (1972)). 
12
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 18 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol18/iss1/3
THE FACTS OF STIGMA 
139 
Fourteenth Amendment.49 The Court held that state-created stigma only triggers 
procedural due process protection when it is accompanied by the abridgement of 
some “right or status previously recognized by state law” or “guaranteed in one 
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.”50 
In September 1971, Edward Charles Davis III was arrested in Louisville, 
Kentucky for shoplifting. The charge was later dismissed. A year later, the chief 
of police of Louisville, acting in his official capacity, distributed a flyer 
identifying “Active Shoplifters.”51 A photo of Davis along with his name was 
included on the flyer. When Davis’s employer found out that he had been listed 
in this flyer, he was not fired but was told that another arrest could lead to his 
termination. Although not actually fired, Davis stated that he felt “humiliation 
and ridicule” from members of his department and he ultimately left the job.52 
After leaving this job, he found it difficult to find new employment. At the time 
of the lawsuit, he was unemployed.53 
Davis filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, arguing that his inclusion on the flyer 
by the police chief without appropriate procedural protections violated his right 
to procedural due process.54 The District Court found for the police chief, but 
when Davis appealed, the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and held that stigma was relevant but insufficient to garner procedural 
protections.55 The court explained that due process protection was intended to 
protect those rights guaranteed through either state law or the Constitution. 
Reputation alone, without some additional harm, was not protected by either.56 
This standard, that stigma coupled with some tangible harm recognized by law, 
such as loss of employment or property, triggers due process protection, became 
known as the “stigma plus” standard.57 
Three years later, in Addington v. Texas, the court considered how stigma 
that results from a state-imposed label affects the procedural due process analysis 
in the context of civil commitment proceedings.58 Appellant, Frank 
O’Neal Addington, had been temporarily committed several times from 1969–
1975. After he was arrested for “assault by threat” against his mother, she filed a 
                                                 
 49 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
 50 Paul, 424 U.S. at 710 n.5, 711. 
 51 Id. at 695; Mitnick, supra note 48 at 87. 
 52 Mitnick, supra note 48 at 88 (citing Edward Charles Davis III, A “Keep Out” Sign on the 
Courthouse Doors?, JURIS DR., (1976)). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Paul, 424 U.S. at 694. 
 55 Id. at 696–97. 
 56 Id. at 708. 
 57 See Lindsey Webb, The Procedural Due Process Rights of the Stigmatized Prisoner, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1055, 1069 (2013). 
 58 Addington, 441 U.S. at 418. 
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petition to have him committed indefinitely.59 At trial, the judge instructed the 
jury that to commit Addington, their findings must be substantiated by clear and 
convincing evidence. Following the jury’s finding that Addington should be 
committed, Addington appealed on procedural due process grounds. He argued 
that because civil commitment results in the same deprivation of liberty as 
imprisonment, due process requires the application of the higher, beyond a 
reasonable doubt evidentiary standard.60 The state appellate court agreed and 
reversed, but on appeal, the Texas Supreme Court reversed again. The Texas 
Supreme Court found that procedural due process only required proof based on a 
preponderance of the evidence, an even lower standard than the trial court had 
initially required. Addington appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court 
granted certiorari. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that, in fact, while the highest standard 
was not required, the intermediate clear and convincing evidence standard was 
appropriate, because civil commitment “constitutes a significant deprivation of 
liberty that requires due process protection.”61 In reaching this conclusion, Justice 
Burger, writing for the Court,62 stated that civil commitment following the 
determination that an individual is dangerous (which was required by the Texas 
law) creates “adverse social consequences” for the committed individual.”63 He 
further elaborated: “whether we label this phenomena [sic] ‘stigma’ or choose to 
call it something else is less important than that we recognize that it can occur 
and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual.”64 
Vitek v. Jones was decided the following year.65 On May 31, 1974, appellant 
Larry D. Jones was convicted of robbery and sentenced to three to nine years in 
Nebraska state prison. Nine months later he was transferred to the prison hospital 
and then placed in solitary confinement. While in solitary confinement, he 
burned his mattress and burned himself in the process. After being treated for the 
resulting burns, he was transferred to a state mental hospital.66 The transfer was 
authorized by a Nebraska statute, which stated that: “[w]hen a designated 
physician or psychologist finds that a prisoner ‘suffers from a mental disease or 
defect’ and ‘cannot be given proper treatment in that facility,’” the Director of 
Correctional Services may transfer that prisoner to any suitable facility within or 
outside of the correctional system.67 
                                                 
 59 Id. at 419. 
 60 Id. at 421. 
 61 Id. at 425. 
 62 Justice Powell took no part in the consideration of the case or the decision. 
 63 Id. at 426. 
 64 Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26. 
 65 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 480. 
 66 Id. at 484. 
 
67
 Id. at 483 (citing NEBRASKA REV. STAT. § 83–180(1) (1976)). 
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Following his transfer, Jones joined a suit challenging the constitutionality 
of the Nebraska statute. Although people lose many freedoms upon incarceration, 
the Supreme Court has held that “[p]risoners may . . . claim the protections of the 
Due Process Clause. They may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.”68 A three-judge District Court, empaneled pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (now repealed), found for Jones and his fellow 
plaintiffs, determining that the statute was unconstitutional because a transfer to a 
mental health facility invoked a liberty interest that requires additional procedural 
protections.”69 The District Court enjoined the state from transferring Jones to the 
mental hospital without appropriate due process.70 The state appealed to the 
Supreme Court directly.71 The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the District 
Court. 72 Justice White, writing for the majority, stated its holding: 
the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital 
for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the 
subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as 
a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations 
of liberty that requires procedural protections.73 
As in Paul, the Court held that stigma was insufficient alone to create a 
liberty interest, but that stigma that resulted from a transfer coupled with 
mandated treatment implicated a liberty interest and therefore required 
procedural protections.74 This was the first time the Supreme Court explicitly 
                                                 
 68 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 
 69 Id. at 488. 
 70 28 U.S.C. § 2281 provided: “An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the 
enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of 
such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative 
board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge 
thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is 
heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title. 28 U.S.C. § 
2281 (1970). 
 71 28 U.S.C. § 1253 provided for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of this type of injunction 
(“Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order 
granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil 
action, suit or proceeding required by an Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district 
court of three judges.”). 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). 
 72 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 485 (citing Vitek v. Miller, 434 U.S. 1060 (1978)). While it was 
ultimately a 5–4 decision, those writing in concurrence and dissent did not disagree with the court’s 
holding that this type of transfer required due process protections. Rather, these justices disagreed 
with respect to the appropriate level of procedural protections and whether the Court could hear the 
case at all. See id. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id. at 501 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 
501 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 73 Id. at 494. 
 74 Webb, supra note 57 at 1073–74 (quoting Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494) (“The Vitek Court, like Paul, found a liberty interest in the 
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included stigma in the due process analysis associated with transfer from a prison 
to a mental health facility, or any involuntary commitment in the prison context. 
In holding the Nebraska statute unconstitutional the District Court had based 
its conclusion in part on the fact that commitment creates stigmatizing 
consequences. Justice White agreed with this conclusion, stating that 
“commitment to a mental hospital” has “adverse social consequences.”75 He 
offered two case citations to support this assertion. First, he quoted Justice 
Burger’s consequences language in Addington.76 Second, he cited to a statement 
in a case decided by the Supreme Court earlier that year, to be discussed more in 
Part IV.c.ii, infra.77 In this case, the Court stated that commitment, in this case 
the commitment of a child, might trigger some negative, social consequences 
“because of the reaction of some to the discovery that the child has received 
psychiatric care.”78 To substantiate this conclusion, the Supreme Court in that 
case had cited to the same “adverse social consequences” language in Addington. 
Addington and Vitek were landmark decisions in mental health law. For the 
first time the Supreme Court held that the stigma of mental health commitment, 
in both the civil and criminal contexts, is real and so damaging to liberty that it 
was to be considered in procedural due process analysis. 
d. Stigma of mental health commitment in procedural due process since 
Addington and Vitek 
While Addington and Vitek importantly clarified that the stigma of mental 
health commitment was relevant to procedural due process analysis, these cases 
left a number of questions related to the application of these standards 
unanswered. First, the Court did not clarify which consequences of stigma were 
relevant to the analysis. In Addington, Justice Burger referred to the “adverse 
social consequences” that result from commitment, but then went on to say such 
consequences may accurately be labeled ‘stigma’ generally.79 Justice White 
merely referred to “the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental 
hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment” without additional clarification. 
As discussed in Part II.b, supra, there is both public and internalized stigma 
which can result in various, negative consequences. The justices did not specify 
                                                                                                                         
combination of stigma and a specific type of consequence--the ‘mandatory behavior modification’ involved in mental health treatment--associated 
with that stigma. As under Paul, stigma must accompany the condition, just as a particular type of condition must accompany the stigma, in order for 
a liberty interest to exist. In Vitek, the Court noted that the conditions that Mr. Vitek experienced in the mental institution in which he was confined, 
considered alone, ‘might not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest retained by a prisoner.’”). 
 75 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492. 
 76 Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26). 
 77 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
 78 Id. at 600 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26). 
 79 Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26. 
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which of these consequences judges are to consider in the procedural due process 
analysis because they did not engage in any discussion of these specific 
consequences. 
What is more, because both justices spent very little time discussing how 
they arrived at their conclusions that commitment causes stigma, it was left 
unclear how broadly these conclusions apply. Neither case explained, for 
example, whether a commitment order for several days would result in the same 
stigma as a commitment order for a longer period of time. In Vitek, Justice White 
did not clarify whether the stigma to which he referred was that in the eyes of the 
general public or that in the eyes of prison population. He did not clarify whether 
this stigma only attached because the plaintiff was transferred to a facility outside 
of the prison system or whether it would attach if transferred to any mental health 
facility. 
Finally, it is not obvious from either decision how stigma fits into the overall 
procedural due process analysis. In Addington, Justice Burger noted the existence 
of the stigma and consequently upheld the use of an intermediate evidentiary 
standard but did not state explicitly what role stigma should play in the 
procedural due process analysis. In Vitek, Justice White held that stigma coupled 
with mandatory treatment implicated a liberty interest, akin to the “stigma plus” 
standard established in Paul. Yet it is not clear from Vitek whether any plus 
factor, such as demonstrable proof of any of the stigmatizing consequences of 
stigma would be sufficient to implicate a liberty interest, or whether under this 
standard, standard mandatory treatment is necessary to trigger procedural due 
process protections. 
III. METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE 
a. Opinion collection and selection 
To determine how federal judges have treated the stigma of mental health 
commitment in procedural due process analysis since Addington and Vitek, a 
systematic review was conducted of all federal judicial opinions that have 
discussed this topic since Addington was decided on April 29, 1979. Specifically, 
the search identified all federal cases, both published and unpublished, that 
discussed: stigma and related concepts (such as social consequences and shame), 
involuntary commitment and related concepts (such as involuntary treatment and 
inpatient commitment), and mental health and related concepts, within a single 
paragraph.80 Search criteria were developed through reading case law, to 
                                                 
 80 To find these opinions, a search was conducted in Westlaw, limiting to all federal 
jurisdictions, using the following search criteria: ((psychol! psychiat! personalit! mental!) /3 
(disorder! ill! health! disabil! disease! diagnos!)) /p stigma! “social costs” “social consequences” 
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determine the terms judges use in this context, as well as literature related to 
mental illness, mental health commitment, and stigma. This search yielded 206 
opinions. 
From these 206 opinions, the study sample was selected based on four 
criteria. First, the sample was limited to those opinions issued after Addington. 
Second, opinions that included all of the search terms but did not actually discuss 
stigma in the context of mental health commitment were removed. These 
opinions might have, for example, discussed the mental health history of 
defendants, “commitment” of certain crimes, and the stigma of arrest. Or, these 
opinions may have presented issues related to the stigma of mental health 
commitment, say in a background section, but ultimately did not discuss the 
substance of the issues because they were decided on procedural grounds. These 
opinions may have even cited to the holdings in Addington and Vitek but did not 
include any larger discussion of mental health commitment. Many of these 
opinions were 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions unrelated to mental health commitment 
brought by prisoners who merely analogized their situations to that described in 
Vitek, often in a footnote.81 Ultimately, these opinions were all removed. 
Third, opinions discussing issues related to sex offender treatment and 
labeling were removed. These opinions contained the search terms, because a 
number of Circuits have extended the holding in Vitek to apply to prisoners 
labeled as sex offenders. Although this topic is related to the issue of mental 
health commitment, these opinions were removed from the study sample to 
simplify analysis. 
Fourth and finally, the sample was limited to those opinions that discussed 
procedural due process. Although the search criteria yielded opinions that 
discussed the stigma of mental health commitment in a variety of legal contexts, 
including substantive due process, equal protection, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, and the Second Amendment, for this Note, the scope was 
limited to those opinions that discuss this issue in the context of procedural due 
process. Following these exclusions, the study sample consisted of fifty-three 
opinions. Table 1 shows how many opinions were excluded at each step of the 
opinion selection. 
 
                                                                                                                         
“scarlet letter” shame embarrassment disgrace curse /p commitment hospitalization (commit! /3 
(civil! inpatient mental involun!)) “compelled treatment” “involun! treat!” “inpatient treatment” 
“mental hospital!” “involuntarily admit!”. 
 81 Twelve (unpublished) opinions that included the following language as their only 
discussion of the relevant issue were excluded: “Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) 
(prisoner possesses liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in freedom from involuntary 
transfer to state mental hospital coupled with mandatory treatment for mental illness, a punishment 
carrying ‘stigmatizing consequences’ and ‘qualitatively different’ from punishment 
characteristically suffered by one convicted of a crime).” 
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Table 1. Opinion Selection 
             
No. of 
Opinions 
1. All federal opinions containing search criteria, 206 
2.  Decided after Addington v. Texas (April 29, 1979), 185 
3. 
  
That discuss stigma in the context of mental health 
commitment or sex offender treatment, 
96 
4.       Limited to mental health commitment, 61 
5.         
Limited to discussion in the context of procedural 
due process. 53 
 
b. Content analysis 
The remaining fifty-three opinions82 were reviewed using ethnographic 
content analysis. This method required reviewing opinions without particular 
categories in mind, developing categories, and then re-reading the opinions to 
categorize them by the themes that emerged. To implement this methodology, all 
discussion of stigma of mental health commitment in the context of procedural 
due process from the opinions was identified and collected. Once this 
information was collected from all the opinions in the sample, it was reviewed to 
determine what similarities and differences existed between the opinions. These 
findings emerged into themes and each of the fifty-three opinions was assigned 
one or more of these themes, as will be discussed further in Part IV, supra. 
There are of course limitations to this study. While this study focuses on 
federal courts, much of civil and criminal commitment occurs in state courts. 
This study does not account for how state court judges engage with the stigma of 
mental health commitment. Additionally, the information collected concerns 
judges’ discussion of stigma in the context of procedural due process rather than 
case outcomes. While in general judges seemed to deny plaintiffs procedural due 
process protections, this information was not recorded systematically, because 
there are so many variables that could affect this outcome. As discussed above, 
this study was limited to the context of procedural due process. Findings do not 
necessarily translate to how judges engage the stigma of mental health 
commitment in other legal contexts. Finally, while the sample includes both 
published and unpublished opinions, it does not account for those cases in which 
judges have chosen not to write opinions at all. 
                                                 
 82 Vitek is among the fifty-three opinions included in the sample since it was decided roughly 
a year after Addington. 
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c. Description of the sample 
The fifty-three opinions analyzed were decided over the years 1979 to 2015. 
The first case was decided on June 20, 1979 and the last on February 10, 2015. 
The number of cases was relatively evenly distributed over time, although fewer 
seem to have been decided in the 1990’s than in the other three decades in the 
sample. Figure 1 shows the number of opinions in the sample decided by year. 
 
Figure 1. No. of Opinions by Year 
 
The sample includes at least one opinion from every circuit as well as four 
Supreme Court cases, including Vitek. The opinions were also relatively evenly 
distributed by court type: roughly half were trial-court opinions and half 
appellate opinions. Table 2 shows the number of opinions decided by circuit, in 
total and broken out by whether the case was decided by a District Court or the 
Court of Appeals for that circuit. The court information provided by Westlaw 
was used to determine the circuit from which each opinion came. The sample 
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sample, so there are multiple opinions in the sample for the same case. 
 






First Circuit 2 1 1 
Second Circuit 8 3 5 
Third Circuit 9 2 7 
Fourth Circuit 4 2 2 
Fifth Circuit 4 2 2 
Sixth Circuit 6 3 3 
Seventh Circuit 1 1 0 
Eighth Circuit 4 2 2 
Ninth Circuit 3 1 2 
Tenth Circuit 6 4 2 
Eleventh Circuit 1 1 0 
D.C. Circuit 1 0 1 
Supreme Court 4 - - 
Total 53 26 27 
 
Finally, cases in the sample pertained to both civil commitment and criminal 
commitment. Cases were occasionally difficult to categorize. For example, if a 
person was detained by the police for psychiatric evaluation, this was categorized 
as a case relating to civil law, because the detainment is not considered an arrest. 
On the other hand, cases related to criminal defendants pleading not guilty for 
reason of insanity were categorized as criminal, even though, in some states, such 
defendants are subsequently committed under civil commitment laws. 
 
Table 3. No. of Opinions in Civil and Criminal Cases 
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IV. RESULTS 
Across the fifty-three opinions reviewed, judges consistently spent very little 
time discussing the stigma of mental health commitment relative to other issues. 
Within this limited discussion of mental health stigma, four main themes 
emerged. First, many opinions in the sample did not discuss stigma beyond 
restating the conclusions drawn in Addington and Vitek and either applying their 
holdings or distinguishing the facts at bar from those in Addington and Vitek. 
Among these opinions it was often unclear what role stigma played in the overall 
procedural due process analysis. There were also opinions that contained 
somewhat more extended discussion of stigma, and among these discussions, 
three themes emerged. First, there were opinions that compared the stigma of 
mental health commitment with stigma resulting from other circumstances. 
Second, there were opinions that contained more involved discussion of either 
the consequences or causes of stigma. Finally, some opinions stated explicitly 
that the stigma of mental health commitment and related issues were so obvious, 
there was no need to discuss them more broadly - despite the supposed 
obviousness of the stigma, many of these opinions found procedural due process 
was not required. None of even those opinions with a somewhat expanded 
discussion of stigma engaged the full scope of the harm caused by the 
consequences of stigma. 
a. Discussion of stigma limited to quoting Addington and Vitek 
Many of the opinions in the sample contained almost no discussion of stigma 
other than to cite to the consequences language in Addington and Vitek.83 These 
cases arose in both the civil and prison contexts across the entire time period 
covered by the sample, although more seem to have been filed more recently. 
Among some of these cases, it was clear that the presence of stigma triggered or 
would trigger additional procedural protections.84 
In many other cases, because there was so little additional discussion, it was 
not clear what role the stigma ultimately played in the judge’s decision to grant 
or deny due process protections.85 For example, in an opinion by the then 
Northern District of New York, the court denied defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment against a prisoner claiming that his due process rights were violated 
when transferred to the mental health treatment wing of the prison without due 
                                                 
 83 Addington, 441 U.S. at 426; Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494. 
 84 E.g., United States v. Visinaiz, 96 F. App’x 594, 597 (10th Cir. 2004); Bucano v. Sibum, 
No. 3:12-CV-606, 2012 WL 2395262 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2012). 
 85 E.g., Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Barajas, 331 F.3d 
1141, 1147 (10th Cir. 2003); Cummings v. Darsey, No. CIV.A. 06-5925 (RBK), 2007 WL 174159, 
at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2007). 
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process. Yet while the court ultimately decided that there were outstanding 
questions of fact that made summary judgment inappropriate, it is not clear what 
role stigma played in this decision or what role the judge believed stigma plays in 
procedural due process analysis more generally. The judge referenced stigma in 
two places in the opinion. First, the judge discussed Vitek but cited the case for 
the proposition that the plaintiff was entitled to prove he had a mental illness 
before “suffering the stigmatizing effects of transfer to a mental institution” 
rather than to discuss the stigma of the transfer itself.86 Later in the discussion, 
the judge referenced stigma again in addressing the defendant’s contention that 
being transferred to the mental health wing was better than being placed in 
protective custody and similar to remaining in the general population. He stated: 
“certainly from the plaintiff’s point of view, the APPU [the mental health 
treatment wing] is less desirable than the general population, and it is claimed it 
has stigma attached to it by the general population inmates.”87 Yet, rather than 
suggesting that this stigma, coupled with mandatory treatment, implicated a 
liberty interest, per Vitek, the judge went on to undercut the defendants’ point on 
other grounds. Based on this brief discussion, it was not clear how, in the judge’s 
view, stigma fit within the procedural due process analysis in general. 
Many other opinions also confined discussion of stigma to references to 
Addington and Vitek, but ultimately held procedural protections were 
inappropriate by distinguishing the facts of the case at bar from those in those 
two cases. In these cases, judges generally distinguished from Addington and 
Vitek without going into whether the facts of the instant cases could in 
themselves result in stigmatic consequences or, if they did not, why they did 
not.88 For example, in a case before the District Court of Idaho, plaintiff David 
Tyler Hill, who had been incarcerated by the Idaho Department of Corrections 
(IDOC) at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution (IDSI), brought a 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 action against the IDOC and its chief psychologist.89 Specifically, Mr. Hill 
challenged his transfer to an area of the IDSI designated for mental health 
treatment without a hearing.90 In considering whether his transfer implicated 
procedural due process, the judge cited to the Vitek “stigmatizing consequences” 
language but then distinguished Mr. Hill’s situation from that in Vitek. He 
explained that Mr. Hill’s transfer was different than the transfer in Vitek, because 
Mr. Hill never left IDOC facilities, whereas in Vitek the plaintiff was transferred 
                                                 
 86 Flowers v. Coughlin, 551 F. Supp. 911, 915 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 87 Id. at 916. 
 88 See, e.g., Pierce v. Blaine, 467 F.3d 362, 371 (3rd Cir. 2006) (distinguishing from Vitek, 
because the judge determined that the plaintiff in Vitek had been transferred for an indefinite period 
of time while the plaintiff in the instant case was transferred for several weeks for psychiatric 
evaluation); Green v. Dormire, 691 F.3d 917, 922 (8th Cir. 2012) (same). 
 89 Hill v. Reinke, No. 1:13-CV-00038-BLW, 2014 WL 7272939 (D. Idaho Dec. 18, 2014). 
 90 Id. at *2. 
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out of a facility run by the Department of Corrections and into a “state agency 
run hospital.”91 The district judge did not explain why this type of transfer would 
be less stigmatizing nor did he examine the potentially stigmatizing 
consequences of Mr. Hill’s transfer.92 Ultimately, the judge concluded that the 
transfer did not implicate a liberty interest and the court granted defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment.93 
Judges distinguished from Vitek on other grounds and did not discuss why or 
if these distinguishing factors affected the stigma of the commitment. One such 
factor was length of commitment. According to these opinions, the plaintiff in 
Vitek was transferred to a state run hospital for an indefinite period of time94 and 
so judges did not apply Vitek in situations in which plaintiffs were committed for 
finite amounts of time, for example, for several weeks for psychiatric 
evaluation.95 Judges did so without discussing why this type of commitment 
would be less stigmatizing than commitment for an indefinite amount of time. 
Among these opinions, there were some with very minimal discussion of 
stigma that found that procedural due process protections were or would be 
required, but more often judges distinguished from the facts in Addington and 
Vitek and determined that procedural due process protections were not 
appropriate with little discussion. 
b. Comparison to stigma created by other circumstances 
In a number of opinions in the sample, the discussion analogized the stigma 
of mental health commitment to the stigma associated with other circumstances. 
Judges examined a number of other potentially stigmatizing circumstances. This 
section begins with an extended discussion of the comparison made to the stigma 
of insanity pleas, because the issue split two Circuits and was ultimately decided 
by the Supreme Court, in one of the four opinions in the sample. The Supreme 
Court subsequently applied its ruling on this issue in another one of the four 
opinions in the sample. 
i. Insanity pleas 
In 1980, the Second Circuit considered a due process challenge to 
commitment proceedings following a determination that a defendant was not 
                                                 
 91 Id. at *18. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at *1. 
 94 In fact, the statute at issue in Vitek provided that in order to keep a prisoner committed after 
their sentence has elapsed, the hospital must hold a civil commitment hearing. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 
484. 
 95 E.g., Pierce, 467 F.3d at 371; Green, 691 F.3d at 922. 
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guilty of criminal charges by reason of insanity.96 Per Connecticut law, after the 
defendant, Mr. Warren, was acquitted by reason of insanity, a hearing was held 
to determine whether he was a danger to himself or others and therefore should 
be committed to a mental health facility. At the hearing, it was determined, based 
on a preponderance of the evidence, that he was a danger and he was 
committed.97 He petitioned the court for his release because he argued that this 
evidentiary standard, used at both his commitment hearing and subsequent 
release hearings, violated procedural due process.98 
In considering the challenge, the Second Circuit took up the liberty interest 
and specifically the issue of stigma associated with mental health commitment in 
this situation. The court determined that commitment that follows from a 
pleading of not guilty by reason of insanity does not result in stigma, because the 
person is already stigmatized. The Court seemed to suggest that the defendant 
had reached a sort of stigma ceiling. The Second Circuit wrote: “[a]ny stigma 
resulting from the label ‘mentally ill and dangerous’ certainly attached at the time 
the accused was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Additional stigma which 
might result from subsequent commitment to a mental hospital must be regarded 
as minimal, if any.”99 The Court did not provide any explanation for this 
conclusion. 
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit considered the same question but disagreed 
with the Second Circuit, holding that a defendant that pleads not guilty by reason 
of insanity can become further stigmatized through commitment.100 The Fifth 
Circuit interpreted the Second Circuit’s holding as stating that the initial stigma 
that results from pleading not guilty by reason of insanity results from the 
“judicial determination . . . that they [the defendants] committed a crime and that 
no additional stigma attaches upon commitment.”101 This conclusion, the Fifth 
Circuit stated, was inconsistent with the holding in Vitek, because there the 
Supreme Court determined that a prisoner, an individual that has been convicted 
of a crime, can still face additional stigma upon transfer to a mental hospital.102 It 
is possible the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the Second Circuit’s holding. The 
initial stigma referred to by the Second Circuit seems to have been that which 
results from the judicial determination that a defendant is not responsible for a 
crime because he is insane, rather than that from a judicial determination that an 
individual committed a crime. While this seems to be the more likely 
                                                 
 96 Warren v. Harvey, 632 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 97 Id. at 929. 
 98 Id. at 931. 
 99 Id. at 931–32. 
 100 Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511, 524–25 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated sub nom. Ledbetter v. Benham, 463 U.S. 1222 (1983). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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interpretation, it is hard to be sure since the Second Circuit spent so little time on 
the discussion, and, regardless, the Fifth Circuit clearly thought otherwise. 
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that additional stigma could result from a 
transfer from prison to a mental health facility after pleading not guilty by reason 
of insanity. 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue a year later.103 The Court considered 
the issue of whether additional stigma could result from commitment following 
an insanity plea, in a footnote, and agreed with the Second Circuit. Footnote 
sixteen of Justice Powell’s opinion stated only that: “[a] criminal defendant who 
successfully raises the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict 
itself, and thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect.”104 
The Court seemed to endorse this idea of a stigma ceiling in this context, 
although it did so without reference to case law or external evidence. Justice 
Brennan, in dissent, commented on this conclusion, but did not disagree with 
it.105 He stated only that Justice Powell put too much emphasis on the lack of 
additional stigma in his due process analysis and in fact there should be more 
emphasis place on the physical intrusion and restraint placed on committed 
individuals.106 This was the first time since Vitek the Supreme Court directly 
addressed the role of the stigma of mental health commitment in procedural due 
process. 
Shortly after this case was decided, the Fifth Circuit case discussed above, 
was remanded and vacated.107 This issue arose in two other cases in the sample. 
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court took up another case related to 
commitment following an insanity plea and again held that no additional stigma 
resulted from commitment.108 A decade after that, in a case before the Tenth 
Circuit, the Court also applied the Supreme Court’s conclusion.109 
ii. Criminal Conviction 
Judges also compared the stigma of mental health commitment with that of 
criminal conviction, separately from pleading insanity. One of these opinions 
provides an example of a judge looking to cases beyond Addington and Vitek to 
inform a conclusion related to the stigma of mental health commitment. In a case 
before the Fourth Circuit, plaintiff Theresa Gooden brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
                                                 
 103 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
 104 Id. at 367 n.16. 
 105 Id. at 371 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Ledbetter, 463 U.S. at 1222. 
 108 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 114 (1992). 
 109 United States v. Weed, 389 F.3d 1060, 1068 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 
367 n.16). 
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action against police officers and her county after she was taken from her 
apartment to a hospital for emergency mental health commitment.110 In 
discussing the potential harm that may arise from a seizure for civil commitment, 
the judge quoted a district court’s assessment from 1979 that “such a deprivation 
can create ‘a stigma of mental illness which can be as debilitating as that of 
criminal conviction.’”111 This quotation, in turn cited to a 1973 D.C. Circuit case 
and a 1963 hearing before a Senate Subcommittee.112 In grappling with this 
question, whether the stigma of involuntary civil commitment is as “as severe” as 
criminal conviction, the judge in the 1973 D.C. Circuit case looked to then 
current studies in addition to then current news stories and Congressional 
hearings from the previous decade on the issue.113 
In relying on this case law, the judge was in fact relying on conclusions the 
judges in those cases drew based on external sources of information on stigma, 
including studies, news stories, and Congressional hearings. Yet, these sources of 
evidence, relied upon in 1990, were from the 1960’s and 1970’s. While it is 
possible that the stigma of both of these circumstances remained constant in the 
intervening twenty to thirty years, it is not clear why the judge did not just rely 
on similar, more current sources. 
iii. History of Mental Illness 
In other opinions, judges opined on whether a long history of mental illness 
erases any additional stigma that may be created by commitment. In one such 
opinion, the judge looked to how juries had thought about stigma in the past to 
inform his determination of whether the jury’s damages award for a six-day 
commitment without adequate procedural protection was reasonable. 114 The jury 
had awarded the plaintiff, Robert Marion, $750,000 in compensatory damages 
for the deprivation of liberty he suffered over the course of his six-day 
commitment. In determining what amount of compensatory damages were 
appropriate, the judge compared Mr. Marion’s situation to three cases in which 
                                                 
 110 Gooden v. Howard Cty., Md., 917 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1990), opinion superseded on 
reh’g, 954 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 111 Id. at 1363 (quoting Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. 1167, 1173 (D. Md. 1979) (quoting 
Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F.Supp. 439, 444 (S.D.Iowa 1976)). Although, according to Westlaw, the 
relevant quotation is at Stamus, 414 F.Supp. at 449. 
 112 Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F.Supp. 439, 449 (S.D.Iowa 1976)) (“ . . . the legal and social 
consequences of commitment constitute a stigma of mental illness which can be as debilitating as 
that of a criminal conviction. See In re Ballay, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 482 F.2d 648, 668–69 (1973); 
Hearings on S. 935 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 38 (1963).”). 
 113 In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 114 Marion v. LaFargue, No. 00 CIV. 0840 (DFE), 2004 WL 330239 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 
2004). 
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individuals had been committed without having previously been diagnosed as 
mentally ill. The judge concluded that the cases were distinguishable, and that 
“Marion’s case for damages was significantly weaker.”115 He explained: 
It was undisputed that Marion has had serious mental illness for 
many years. It seems clear that the other three juries were 
convinced that the plaintiffs never had any mental illness. . . . 
Accordingly, the amounts that those plaintiffs received for 
emotional damages are attributable only in part to the days of 
confinement, and in large part to the lingering stigma that 
unfortunately attaches to findings of mental illness. . . .116 
Consequently, the judge determined that Mr. Marion was entitled to less 
than the defendants in these cases and less than what the jury had awarded him. 
The judge reduced the award from $750,000 to $150,000. It seems his decision 
was driven in part by his conclusion (based on past jury behavior) that stigma 
attaches when an individual is labeled as mentally ill and if already labeled, 
additional stigma does not occur upon commitment. Like the person who brings 
an insanity defense and now faces commitment, Mr. Marion had reached his 
stigma ceiling and, consequently, was entitled to far less damages for the 
violation of his procedural due process than if he had not had a history of mental 
illness. The judge came to this conclusion by considering past jury behavior 
rather than engaging in fact finding related to the current stigma of mental health 
commitment. 
These opinions provide examples of judges either comparing the stigma of 
mental health commitment to other types of stigma. Because these types of 
comparisons were largely not addressed in either Addington or Vitek, judges were 
forced to consider other sources of information, or rely on personal opinion, in 
coming to conclusions on this matter. In general, judges favored looking to 
information from the past, such as prior case law or past jury behavior, rather 
than current sources of information, such as recent studies. Additionally, 
different judges relied on the same sources of information but came to very 
different conclusions. As discussed above, two appellate courts considered the 
same question, whether commitment following an insanity plea creates additional 
stigma, and relying on the same case law, came to entirely different results. The 
Supreme Court ultimately resolved this issue, but this is one of only a few issues 
the Court has addressed since it decided Addington and Vitek. There were many 
other inconsistencies in how judges were comparing this stigma to other forms of 
stigma that the Court has not addressed. 
                                                 
 115 Id. at *10. 
 116 Id. 
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c. Some discussion of the consequences and causes of the stigma of mental 
health commitment 
i. Consequences of stigma 
There were several opinions in the sample that included a broader discussion 
of the consequences discussed in Addington and Vitek. In both Addington and 
Vitek, the Supreme Court focused on consequences, specifically the “adverse 
social consequences” and the “stigmatizing consequences” of commitment 
without additional discussion of specific consequences.117 Although many 
opinions did not discuss these consequences any further, there were some in the 
sample that expanded upon this idea. Several of these opinions kept the 
discussion very general. For example, in a 1986 D.C. Circuit opinion, the judge 
stated that the: “personal and social consequences of commitment have a 
profound impact on a person long after he has been treated and released.”118 He 
substantiated this conclusion by citing to Addington.119 
There were just a few other opinions that discussed the consequences of 
stigma in more specific terms, identifying the individual consequences that may 
result from the stigma associated with commitment. For example, in a 1985 
North Carolina District Court case, the judge considered whether due process 
protections were required for a transfer to a mental health facility within the 
Department of Corrections. The case came to the court from a magistrate judge 
who had determined that this type of transfer did not implicate a liberty interest 
and therefore did not require procedural protections, because unlike in Vitek the 
plaintiff was not transferred outside of the Department of Corrections. The 
magistrate judge determined that the distinction was dispositive because, even 
though Judge White did not state so explicitly, the stigma at issue in Vitek was 
that in the eyes of the public rather than that among other inmates. 
The District Court judge disagreed with the magistrate judge’s interpretation 
of Vitek. He concluded that the transfer did implicate a liberty interest because it 
created stigma within the prison system, which was as harmful as stigma outside 
of the prison system. The judge went on to list specific consequences of a 
transfer to a mental health facility within the prison system: “[d]enial or delay of 
parole, study release, work release, and gain time jobs.”120 Additionally, he stated 
                                                 
 117 Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26; Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494. 
 118 Sanderlin v. United States, 794 F.2d 727, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Baugh v. Woodard, 604 F. Supp. 1529, 1535 (E.D.N.C. 1985), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 808 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1987) (the sole issue on appeal was the timing of the hearing required 
by due process: the District Court had held that such a hearing must take place prior to transfer 
whereas the Fourth Circuit concluded that the hearing could occur immediately after transfer but 
before admission to the mental health facility). 
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that “[t]here is also undisputed evidence that a prisoner returning to the general 
prison population from a mental health unit are viewed as ‘bugs’ by other 
inmates. These prisoners are ostracized and exploited by other prisoners.”121 
While these assertions seem to be supported by the research discussed in Part 
II.b, supra, the judge made these assertions without reference to case law or any 
external evidence. Although many other opinions in the sample considered a 
transfer within the Department of Corrections, this is one of the few opinions that 
engaged in a more detailed analysis of the stigmatizing consequences in this 
context and one of the few to ultimately find that procedural protections were 
required. These opinions, particularly those that included a discussion of specific 
consequences, engaged the harm associated with this stigma more than did other 
opinions and found that procedural protections were appropriate more frequently 
than those opinions that did not engage this discussion. 
ii. Causes of stigma 
There were some opinions that included a discussion of the causes of the 
stigma of mental health commitment. Justice Burger, in Addington, did not 
directly address the causes of the stigma of mental health commitment but did 
discuss what he saw as causing the stigma associated with mental illness 
generally. He asserted: “[o]ne who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness 
and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma.” He cited 
to several articles in psychiatric publications to support this claim.122 Justice 
White, in Vitek, did not engage in any discussion of the causes of the stigma 
associated with mental health commitment. 
In a Third Circuit opinion, the judge considered an appeal from an award of 
attorney’s fees in a class action brought by six named plaintiffs on behalf of all 
juveniles who had or would be committed to mental health facilities pursuant to 
Pennsylvania law by a parent or guardian.123 In the underlying litigation, 
plaintiffs had alleged that this law violated both the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In discussing the liberty 
interest potentially affected by this type of commitment, the judge quoted another 
case in the sample, a 1979 Supreme Court opinion that identified at least one 
cause of the stigma of mental commitment for children: “‘commitment 
sometimes produces adverse social consequences for the child because of the 
                                                 
 121 Id. 
 122 Addington, 441 U.S. at 429 (citing Paul Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary 
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496, 498 (1976); Carol C. Schwartz et 
al., Psychiatric Labeling and the Rehabilitation of the Mental Patient, 31 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 329, 334 (1974)). 
 123 Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 901 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
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reaction of some of the discovery that the child has received psychiatric care.’”124 
This quotation, which comes from Parham v. J.R., seems to suggest that the 
stigma associated with commitment is not unique to commitment but would in 
fact result from any type of mental health treatment. Justice Burger, writing for 
the Court, followed this assertion with a citation to the “adverse social 
consequences” language in Addington.125 
In Parham v. J.R, Justice Burger elaborated still further on what in his mind 
causes stigma for individuals facing commitment. The Court was considering a 
procedural due process challenge to a state civil commitment law and ultimately 
upheld its constitutionality. In coming to this conclusion, Justice Burger stated 
that making it more difficult to commit individuals in need of treatment could be 
the real cause of stigma, because “what is truly ‘stigmatizing’ is the 
symptomatology of a mental or emotional illness.”126 To support this contention, 
he cited to the assertion in Addington that to be mentally ill is to never be wholly 
free from stigma.127 
Very few opinions in the sample addressed the causes of the stigma of 
mental health commitment. Those that did seemed to suggest that there is nothing 
uniquely stigmatizing about commitment, but rather that it is the underlying 
mental illness or treatment more generally that causes stigma. This in turn 
prompted these judges to deem procedural protections unnecessary, because the 
individual would experience the stigma regardless of the commitment. 
d. Discussion of the obviousness of issues related to the stigma of mental health 
commitment (and yet often holding such stigma does not trigger procedural 
protections). 
Finally, some opinions mentioned stigma but used language suggesting that 
the conclusions related to this stigma were so obvious there was no need for 
further discussion. In some instances, the obviousness of this stigma would lead 
judges to require procedural protections, yet more often, judges used this 
language, engaged in very minimal discussion of stigma, and ultimately held that 
procedural protections were not required. 
For example, in an opinion from the Southern District of New York, the 
court considered a class action brought by civilly committed individuals arguing 
that it was a violation of procedural due process that the state did not appoint 
psychiatrists to assist in retention hearings.128 Plaintiffs argued that committed 
                                                 
 124 Id. at 913 (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 600). 
 125 Parham, 442 U.S. at 600 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26). 
 126 Id. at 601 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 429). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Goetz v. Crosson, 769 F. Supp. 132, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 967 
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming the District Court’s holding to the extent that in most cases due 
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individuals were due the same level of procedural protections as were criminal 
defendants, but the judge was not convinced. The judge conceded “there is an 
obvious stigma attached to confinement in a mental hospital,”129 but the interest 
of the criminal defendant is “almost uniquely compelling.”130 He went on to 
explain why he found the criminal defendant’s interest more compelling than that 
of the committed individual: the criminal, he asserted, was being punished, not 
treated and the committed individual was committed to protect society but also to 
protect himself. Yet, after describing the stigma as obvious, the judge entertained 
no further discussion of it. He did not consider the specific consequences of the 
stigma associated with commitment (or, incarceration for that matter). While he 
recognized the existence of the stigma, he seemed to give it minimal weight in 
comparison to other factors, without discussing why. 
For another example, in the only Supreme Court case in the sample yet to be 
discussed, the Court engaged the topic of whether additional stigma attaches 
upon the commitment of a person who had plead not guilty by reason of insanity, 
the subject of Part IV.b.i, supra.131 In this discussion, Judge White, writing for 
the Court, used language to suggest the obviousness of the conclusion that 
additional stigma does not in fact attach. To begin, Judge White applied the 
conclusion previously drawn by the Court in a footnote in the case discussed 
above. He wrote, “[s]tigmatization (our concern in Vitek) is simply not a relevant 
consideration where insanity acquittees are involved.”132 Despite this dismissive 
language, he cited to the Supreme Court case and the Second Circuit Court case 
that were discussed above to support this assertion. Yet in addition to citing to 
the Court’s own precedent and the Second Circuit case, he also offered his own 
opinion on the subject.133 He wrote, “[i]t is implausible, in my view, that a person 
who chooses to plead not guilty by reason of insanity and then spends several 
years in a mental institution becomes unconstitutionally stigmatized by continued 
confinement in the institution after ‘regaining’ sanity.”134 While this particular 
question had been previously decided by the Court, Justice White’s assertion 
seemed to bely something else: that there are some conclusions so obvious there 
                                                                                                                         
process does not require the state to appoint of a psychiatrist but reversing and remanding back to 
the District Court to determine whether there may be some cases that are so factually complicated 
that a psychiatrist expert may be necessary). 
 129 Id. at 135. 
 130 Id. (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78). 
 131 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 71. 
 132 Id. at 114. 
 133 Id. (“As we explained in Jones: ’A criminal defendant who successfully raises the insanity 
defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and thus the commitment causes little 
additional harm in this respect.’ 463 U.S., at 367, n. 16, 103 S.Ct., at 3051, n. 16; see also Warren 
v. Harvey, 632 F.2d, at 931-932.”) 
 134 Id. 
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is no need to consider them further, to look to external research to corroborate. 
While opinions that used this obviousness language did so in different 
contexts, some judges referring to the obviousness of the stigma itself and other 
referring to the obviousness of related conclusions, in general, use of the 
language was associated with very little additional discussion of any of the 
questions that were left unaddressed by Addington and Vitek. Often in these 
opinions judges would go on to find that the presence of stigma did not require 
procedural protections. 
V. DISCUSSION 
a. Judges have an incomplete view of the stigma of mental health commitment. 
Among the fifty-three cases analyzed, there was variability in how and 
whether each opinion discussed stigma. There were those opinions that merely 
re-stated or cited to the language in either Addington or Vitek without any further 
discussion. There were those that drew comparisons between this type of stigma 
and other stigma and therefore engaged in longer discussion. Others engaged in 
some discussion about specific consequences of stigma or a broader discussion of 
consequences of stigma generally and other traced possible sources for that 
stigma. Some stated explicitly that no discussion was required because the stigma 
that results from commitment and other related issues are so obvious. 
Yet, despite this variability, among all fifty-three opinions, judges 
consistently failed to consider the full consequences of stigma associated with 
mental health commitment. As discussed in Part II.b, supra, there are many more 
consequences to the stigma of mental illness and commitment than are described 
in any of the opinions in the sample. Addington, for example, references “adverse 
social consequences,” but it is not clear whether this was meant to include all 
harms that result from stigma, such as employment discrimination, reduced 
income, and decreased ability to live independently. Vitek may have expanded 
the analysis to include all “stigmatizing consequences” but did not go into a 
discussion of what those consequences were. Neither opinion stated explicitly 
what about commitment causes the stigma: whether is it the mental illness, the 
treatment, or, in the prison context, the nature of the transfer itself. Accordingly, 
judges frequently distinguished from both Addington and Vitek based on the facts 
of a particular situation. Judges, for example, distinguished from Vitek, by 
determining that stigma only attaches when an incarcerated person is physically 
transferred out of a prison facility into a mental hospital or when that person is 
transferred for an indefinite amount of time. In distinguishing in this way, these 
judges failed to consider the stigma created by other circumstances. 
Those judges that did engage in broader discussions of the consequences and 
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causes of stigma related to mental health commitment still failed to engage the 
full extent of this stigma. In cases in which judges considered one type of stigma 
relative to another type of stigma, judges determined, for example, that a person 
who was already incarcerated could not face further stigmatization if committed, 
without providing evidence to support that claim. In other opinions, judges failed 
to adequately address what created the stigma associated with mental health 
commitment, some determining that mental illness itself is the cause, others the 
manifestation of symptoms, and most providing no explanation at all. Across all 
fifty-three cases, judges did not consider the full scope of the harm associated 
with the stigma of mental health commitment. 
b. A systematic bias against committed people bringing due process 
challenges. 
Judges’ incomplete understanding of stigma has created a systematic bias 
against individuals bringing procedural due process claims in the mental health 
commitment context. In Addington, the Supreme Court stated that the adverse 
social consequences of mental health commitment were relevant to the 
procedural due process analysis. Vitek further clarified in stating that, in the 
criminal context, the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental health 
facility, coupled with mandatory treatment, implicated a liberty interest and 
therefore triggered due process protections. 
Yet, as discussed above, when judges have applied these standards they have 
not considered the full scope of the harm associated with stigma of mental health 
commitment, because of an incomplete view of that stigma. While some judges 
found that the presence of stigma compelled procedural protections, many did 
not. 
By systematically underestimating the stigmatizing consequences of mental 
health commitment, judges have systematically underestimated the liberty 
interest itself implicated by mental health commitment. This in turn has meant 
that judges have consistently required less rigorous procedural due process 
protections for individuals subject to commitment orders. By requiring less 
rigorous procedural protection, these individuals are at greater risk for erroneous 
commitment. By undervaluing the harm these individuals suffer as a result of the 
stigma of mental health commitment, judges have increased the likelihood that 
individuals are subject to inappropriate commitment orders. 
c. Judges have been overly deferential to Supreme Court fact finding 
Two related issues seem to drive judges’ incomplete engagement with the 
stigma of mental health commitment: overreliance on case law and insufficiency 
of information. This first issue, more specifically put, is that judges seem to be 
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overly deferential to the conclusions drawn by the Supreme Court in Addington 
and Vitek. That is, most judges merely recited the Supreme Court’s conclusion 
that commitment causes stigma or if they did engage in a broader discussion of 
stigma they did so without engaging in their own fact finding related to this 
stigma, as if to suggest that the Supreme Court has already done most of the 
work, no need to do too much more. 
Lower court judges should of course adhere to stare decisis with respect to 
legal rules, yet the conclusion that commitment leads to stigma is not, per se, a 
legal rule. Scholar Allison Orr Larsen and others have described this type of 
conclusion as a legislative fact, that is, “a generalized fact . . . [that] provides 
descriptive information about the world that judges use as foundational building 
blocks to form and apply legal rules.”135 Judges draw these factual conclusions 
based on many different sources, including information provided by parties’ 
briefs, amicus briefs, and their own knowledge and assumptions about the 
world.136 Lower courts choosing to accept and apply these conclusions is what 
Larsen refers to as following “factual precedent”137 and it is not clear in all cases 
that lower courts must in fact do so. 
In some cases, those in which a legal rule is dependent upon a factual 
finding of the Court, it is clear that lower courts must accept and follow the 
Supreme Court’s factual precedent. To illustrate this point, Larsen points to one 
of the Court’s conclusions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.138 
After considering the record in the that case as well as the companion case, 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, concluded that politics are not corrupted by corporate money in 
campaigns.139 When the Court ultimately granted First Amendment protection to 
corporations for such speech, the protection was based in part on this conclusion. 
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court of Montana was presented with 
different evidence and ultimately held that corporate spending could (and did) 
influence politics. The Supreme Court quickly granted certiorari and reversed the 
Supreme Court of Montana in a several-paragraph, per curium opinion.140 
Although the Supreme Court of Montana may have had different evidence that 
could have reasonably supported a different factual conclusion, the Supreme 
Court made clear that its conclusion was controlling. 
Larsen concedes that it is necessary for lower courts to defer to factual 
                                                 
 135 Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 72 (2013). 
 136 Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 
1258–60 (2012). 
 137 Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 135 at 72. 
 138 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 139 Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 135 at 94. 
 140 Id. 
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precedent in cases such as Citizens United. If a legal rule is dependent upon the 
Court’s factual finding, as it was in Citizens United, allowing lower courts to 
reconsider that conclusion would essentially re-litigate the entire issue and could 
“run the risk of chaos or at least a serious weak spot in the Supreme Court’s 
authority.”141 
Like that espoused in Citizens United, the legal rules in Addington and Vitek 
are in one sense dependent upon a factual conclusion made by the Court. 
Generally put, the legal rule that stigma should be considered in the procedural 
due process analysis in the context of mental health commitment is based upon 
the factual conclusion that commitment creates stigmatizing consequences. If 
lower court judges did not accept this factual conclusion, they could then 
conclude that stigma need not be considered in procedural due process. This 
would lead to the chaos of which Larsen warns. As such, lower courts cannot and 
should not do as the Supreme Court of Montana did, and re-litigate the issue of 
whether mental health commitment causes stigma. And, based on my review, 
judges are not doing this, to the extent that they are not explicitly contradicting 
the premise. 
Yet, Larsen also concludes that lower courts are overly deferential to the 
Supreme Court’s factual findings in situations they really should not be. She 
argues that the Supreme Court is no better equipped than are lower courts to 
engage in legislative fact finding and that, in general, lower courts reconsidering 
legislative facts allows for more flexible legal rulings without disrupting legal 
precedent. 
This too applies to Addington and Vitek. While the Supreme Court resolved 
the question of whether commitment has stigmatizing consequences, as discussed 
in Part II.d, supra, the Supreme Court did not resolve many other questions 
relevant to the application of the Addington and Vitek rules. The Supreme Court 
did not discuss what the consequences of stigma are or, relatedly, what weight to 
apply to stigma in the overall procedural due process analysis. The Supreme 
Court did not address what causes the stigma and therefore in what situations this 
stigma may or may not occur. In Vitek specifically, Justice White did not clarify 
whether the relevant stigma was that in the eyes of other prisoners or the public 
at large. Judges have deferred to the Supreme Court’s factual findings with 
respect to all of these questions even though they did not in fact resolve them. 
The fact that the Supreme Court did not consider these questions does not mean 
that lower courts should not consider these questions. In fact, to properly apply 
this test, lower courts must consider these questions. 
While Addington and Vitek clarified that judges must consider the stigma of 
mental health commitment in procedural due process, these rulings did not 
                                                 
 141 Id. at 108. 
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properly clarify how to do so. In order to properly implement these standards, in 
order to properly account for the full harm associated with the stigmatizing 
consequences of the stigma of mental health commitment, judges must do more 
than rely on the Supreme Court’s fact finding in Addington and Vitek. Instead, 
judges must engage in their own fact finding to determine the full harm 
associated with the stigmatizing consequences the Supreme Court has instructed 
must be considered in the procedural due process analysis. 
d. Remedies to assist in judges’ fact finding related to the stigma of mental 
health commitment. 
Accepting that judges must do more to implement the legal rules espoused in 
Addington and Vitek by determining what consequences result from mental 
health commitment, highlights the second issue that seems to drive judges’ 
incomplete view of information: that is, insufficiency of information. If judges 
are to engage in fact finding related to the consequences of stigma, judges need 
access to that information and the expertise to make sense of it.142 
One potential solution could be to divert procedural due process challenges 
to commitment to courts with particular expertise in mental health. The 
Department of Justice works with the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAMHSA) to administer the Mental Health Courts 
Program, an integrated system of judges, lawyers, and mental health 
professionals that deals specifically with nonviolent offenders with mental health 
diagnoses.143 The purpose of this program is to better serve these individuals by 
requiring specialized training for all those involved in the program, offering 
voluntary treatment in exchange for adjusting sentencing or even dropping 
charges, and coordinating case management with a mental health professional. 
The program currently operates roughly forty courts around the country.144 These 
courts’ jurisdiction could be broadened to include constitutional challenges to 
commitment orders. There could certainly be some benefits created by requiring 
all procedural due process challenges to mental commitment to be deferred to 
mental courts. These judges would have more direct and consistent access to 
mental health experts and would therefore have more information about mental 
                                                 
 142 As discussed in Part IV, supra, there were some judges in the sample that relied on 
sources of information on the stigma of mental health commitment other than Addington and Vitek, 
yet these sources, such as prior case law or a judges’ opinions, generally did not reflect the current 
research on the subject. For a fuller discussion of courts’ reliance on antiquated information related 
to mental illness, see Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo’s Nest: Why Do Courts 
Continue to Rely on Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 987 (2002). 
 143 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, Mental Health Court Programs, 
https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=68. 
 144 Id. 
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health in general. These mental health professionals may also have more 
expertise with respect to the real consequences of stigma about which they could 
educate judges. 
On the other hand, these courts have potential drawbacks. Tailoring 
sentencing to include treatment may in itself present separate procedural due 
process issues, given that individuals may feel compelled to accept treatment 
over jail time without appropriate procedural protections. Additionally, given that 
these judges would primarily be engaged in trial litigation and sentencing, they 
may be less-equipped to engage with constitutional matters such as due process 
analysis than would other federal judges that engage deal with more varied 
litigation. Second, separating these individuals from the general population of 
litigants may in fact perpetuate stigma.145 Finally, mental health professionals 
may not necessarily have more information about mental health stigma and may 
therefore not provide judges with the necessary, additional information to 
adequately implement the Addington and Vitek standards. 
Instead, in matters related to legislative fact finding related to the stigma of 
mental health commitment, courts could rely on an independently maintained 
resource, like that discussed by Allison Orr Larsen in her article, Confronting 
Supreme Court Fact Finding.146 She proposed that rather than relying primarily 
on amicus curie briefs or in-house research, as the Supreme Court does currently, 
the Court could rely on resources that aggregate the type of information 
contained within amicus briefs but reflect a broader range of ideas than are 
typically reflected in those briefs. This, Larsen argues, would provide the Court 
information without biasing that information in favor of groups with the 
resources to compile amicus briefs.147 This type of resource could be created for 
the stigma of mental health commitment through collaboration between legal 
groups, like the American Bar Association, and mental health organizations, such 
as the American Psychological Association, or even multiple interest groups with 
differing agendas. This type of resource could allow judges at all levels greater 
access to information, created and maintained by individuals with the relevant 
                                                 
 145 See E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 536 
(2012) (arguing that mental health courts contribute to the stigmatization of mental illness by 
suggesting that offenders with mental illnesses lack the ability to control their actions, are so much 
more vulnerable to recidivism they should be isolated from the general population, and that they 
cannot be trusted to make their own health care treatment choices). 
 146 Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 136 at 1311–12. 
 147 Larsen referenced a particular resource, the American Bar Association’s The Citizen 
Amicus Project, which no longer exists. Id. at 1311. The Native Amicus Briefing Project (NAB) 
has a similar mission, but focuses on particularly on improving federal judges’ understanding of 
federal Indian law. NAB tracks federal cases that deal with Indian law and drafts and submits 
amicus briefs in those cases. The organization is run by a small group of attorneys and works with 
other attorneys, Indian law scholars, law students, and Native organizations. About Us, NATIVE 
AMICUS BRIEFING PROJECT (NAB) (2018), http://nativebrief.sites.yale.edu/about-us. 
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This is the first systematic review of federal judicial opinions that discuss the 
stigma of mental health commitment in the context of procedural due process. 
Results show that many judges limit their discussion of the stigma of mental 
health commitment to citations to Addington or Vitek. While some opinions 
engaged in broader discussions of what specific consequences result from the 
stigma of commitment and the sources of that stigma, in general judges 
articulated an incomplete view of this stigma. This has led judges to consistently 
underestimate the stigma associated with mental health commitment, resulting in 
a systematic bias against plaintiffs bringing procedural due process challenges in 
the context mental health commitment. To address this bias, federal judges must 
engage in more fact finding about the real and complete consequences of stigma 
that results from mental health commitment. 
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